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Was the AMT Effectively Repealed?
by Reed Shuldiner
Reed Shuldiner is the Alvin L. Snowiss
Professor of Law and co-director of the Center
for Tax Law and Policy at the University of
Pennsylvania Law School.
In this article, Shuldiner compares the
alternative minimum tax before and after the
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, arguing that the new
AMT is a much-weakened version of the old
one. He writes that far fewer taxpayers will be
exposed to the AMT and that the likely ones
will be those high-income taxpayers taking
advantage of loopholes — the original target of
the AMT.
Copyright 2018 Reed Shuldiner.
All rights reserved.
Introduction
One of the frequently criticized features of
pre-2018 tax law was the individual alternative
minimum tax. Its repeal was called for by both
candidate and President Trump, and it was
repealed in the House version of the Tax Cuts and
Jobs Act (P.L. 115-97) and in the original draft of
the Senate bill. In the final version of the Senate
bill, however, the AMT survived, albeit with an
increased exemption and an increased threshold
for the phaseout of the exemption. The conference
agreement followed the Senate bill in retaining the
AMT with the increased exemption, but with a
further substantial increase in the phaseout
threshold.
The new AMT is a much-defanged version of
the old AMT. Under old law, in broad income
ranges the AMT was structured relative to the
regular tax such that little preference income was
required to trigger the AMT, and in some cases it
could be triggered by a taxpayer taking no more

than the standard deduction and a minimum
number of personal exemptions.1 By contrast,
under the TCJA there is always a substantial
cushion between the regular tax and the AMT, so
substantial preference income is required to
2
trigger the AMT. At the same time, the regular tax
under the TCJA eliminates key preference items,
including personal exemptions, the state and local
tax deduction over $10,000, and miscellaneous
itemized deductions over the 2 percent floor. The
structural changes in the AMT combined with the
reduction in potential preferences means that the
AMT should cease to be of concern to all but a
small number of taxpayers with unusual tax
circumstances. Comparing the AMT under old
and new law is useful not only for the light it
sheds on current law, but also, given the 2025
sunset in the TCJA, because the old AMT is
3
scheduled to return. In a sense, one might think of
old law as both old and future law.
AMT Overview and TCJA Amendments
The AMT was introduced in 1969 in response
to concerns that some high-income taxpayers
4
didn’t pay any federal income taxes. The idea of
the AMT was to impose a lower rate on a broader
base and thereby guarantee that high-income
taxpayers paid a minimum amount of taxes.
Lower-income taxpayers were kept out of the
1

See the discussion of head of household status below.

2

I use the term “alternative minimum taxable income” to refer to the
taxable excess as defined in section 55(b)(1)(A). I use the terms
“preferences” and “preference income” to refer interchangeably to all
adjustments and tax preferences. See sections 56-58.
3

See, e.g., section 1(j) (limiting changes to the regular tax brackets to
tax years beginning before January 1, 2026) and section 55(d)(4) (limiting
changes to the AMT exemption to tax years beginning before January 1,
2026).
4

For a history of the AMT, see Robert P. Harvey and Jerry Tempalski,
“The Individual AMT: Why It Matters,” 50 Nat’l Tax J. 453-473 (1997). For
a more recent look at the AMT, see Leonard E. Burman, “The Alternative
Minimum Tax: Assault on the Middle Class,” Milkin Inst. Rev., at 12-23
(Fourth Quarter 2007).
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AMT through an exemption. Although originally
targeting high-income taxpayers — the original
AMT targets earned more than $1.5 million in
today’s dollars — over time the AMT began to
affect more and more middle-income taxpayers.
There were two primary reasons for the increased
scope and changed focus of the AMT. First, the
key structural provisions were not indexed for
inflation.5 Second, tax rates were reduced for the
regular tax without adequate corresponding
adjustments to the AMT. The situation became
acute with the Bush tax cuts in 2001, which

significantly reduced rates for the regular tax
while making only temporary and inadequate
adjustments to the AMT.6
As a result of these factors, the number of
taxpayers swept into the AMT began to rise sharply
(see Figure 1). From 1987 to 2001, the number of
taxpayers affected by the AMT increased on average
by 21 percent a year, rising from 140,000 taxpayers to
7
1.6 million taxpayers. After the Bush tax cuts, for the
period 2001-2005, the annual rate of increase jumped
to 41 percent. By 2005, 5 million taxpayers were
subject to the AMT. Congress tinkered with the

6

5

The unindexed provisions were the exemption amount, the
phaseout threshold for the exemption, and the start of the 28 percent
bracket. Indexing was added beginning in 2013 by section 104(b)(1) of
the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-240). See section
55(d)(4).

Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001
(EGTRRA, P.L. 107-16). On the relationship between the Bush tax cuts
and the AMT, see, e.g., Burman, supra note 4, at 18 (“The Bush
administration and its allies understood at the time that the AMT would
‘take back’ a significant portion of the tax cuts.”).
7

All figures are geometric averages based on the data source noted in
Figure 1.
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Table 1. AMT Preferences in 2012
Number of Taxpayers
With AMT Preference
(thousands)

Amount (millions
of dollars)

Taxable income from Form 1040 (including negative amounts) + AMT
adjustments and preferences

4,407

$1,499,292

Preference

Number of Taxpayers

Dollars (in millions)

Percentage of All
Preferences

Percentage

State and local tax deductions net of refunds

4,140

$141,130

63.77%

Personal exemptions

4,327

$49,312

22.28%

Miscellaneous deductions above the 2% floor

1,009

$22,376

10.11%

Standard deduction

206

$1,705

0.77%

Passive activity loss

589

$1,595

0.72%

Incentive stock options

13

$1,482

0.67%

Beneficiaries of estates

103

$1,308

0.59%

Medical deductions

178

$837

0.38%

Private activity bond interest

654

$803

0.36%

Regular tax NOLs net of AMT NOLs

21

$666

0.30%

Depletion

15

$434

0.20%

585

$429

0.19%

2

$344

0.16%

61

$323

0.15%

162

$322

0.15%

47

$274

0.12%

Intangible drilling costs

2

$195

0.09%

Capital gains exclusion (section 1202)

6

$107

0.05%

Mining costs

8

$82

0.04%

R&E expenditures

1

$12

0.01%

Circulation expenses

1

$1

0.00%

—

$1

0.00%

1

-$8

-0.00%

105

-$78

-0.04%

-$955

-0.43%

-$1,391

-0.63%

$221,306

100%

Post-1986 depreciation
Long-term contracts
Other and related
Loss limitations
Certain home-mortgage interest

Large partnerships
Installment sales
Investment interest
Undetermined
Disposition of property

252

Total adjustments and preferences
= AMTI

4,407

$1,720,598

Note: The table contains information on taxpayers who owe additional tax because of the AMT (including lost credits).
Source: Based on data available at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/amt-preference-items-2002-2004-2012.
Underlying source: Office of Tax Analysis, Department of the Treasury (unpublished tabulation).

AMT, particularly the exemption level, to slow the
increase in the number of taxpayers subject to it.

Finally, as part of the American Taxpayer Relief Act
of 2012, Congress enacted a so-called permanent fix,
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further increasing the exemption level and indexing
the AMT for inflation.8 These changes stabilized the
number of taxpayers subject to the AMT. Thus, the
projected number of taxpayers subject to the AMT
for 2018 was 5.2 million, roughly the same as the
9
number in 2005.
The AMT broadens the tax base by adding
back into income a series of tax preferences. Some
of the preferences target what might be
considered traditional business and high-income
taxpayer loopholes. Examples include passive
activity losses, incentive stock options, interest on
private activity bonds, some accelerated
depreciation, long-term contracts, intangible
drilling costs, and mining exploration and
development costs.10 Other preferences are more
mundane personal deductions. For example, the
AMT included the following personal deductions
as tax preferences: (1) the SALT deduction; (2)
personal exemptions; (3) miscellaneous itemized
deductions in excess of the 2 percent floor; and (4)
11
the standard deduction.
Over time, as the AMT effectively shifted to
upper-middle-income taxpayers, personal
deductions made up the lion’s share of the tax
preferences. As shown in Table 1, for 2012, the
most recent year for which data is available, the
SALT deduction alone accounted for 64 percent of
all preferences. Personal exemptions accounted
for another 22 percent, miscellaneous itemized
deductions in excess of the 2 percent floor 10
percent, and the standard deduction another 1
12
percent. Taken together, personal deductions
accounted for 97.4 percent of the preferences
taken into account under the AMT. The AMT thus
had lost its mooring as a tax on high earners using
loopholes and had instead become a muchdisliked tax on families, particularly in high-tax
13
states.

During his campaign, candidate Trump called
for the elimination of the AMT.14 Repeal was again
promised when the “Big Six” group of Republican
leaders — Senate Majority Leader Mitch
McConnell of Kentucky, House Ways and Means
Committee Chair Kevin Brady of Texas, House
Speaker Paul D. Ryan of Wisconsin, Senate
Finance Committee Chair Orrin G. Hatch of Utah,
Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, and thenNational Economic Council Director Gary Cohn
— released their framework for tax reform,15 and
repeal was in both the bill passed by the House
16
and the original chairman’s mark in the Senate.
As the bill worked its way through the Senate,
however, full repeal of the AMT was abandoned,
17
presumably for revenue reasons. Instead, the bill
passed by the Senate increased the AMT
exemption for married taxpayers filing jointly
from $86,200 to $109,400 (from $55,300 to $70,300
for unmarried taxpayers and heads of household)
and increased the threshold for the phaseout of
the AMT exemption for married taxpayers filing
jointly from $164,100 to $208,400 (from $123,100 to
$156,300 for unmarried taxpayers and heads of
18
household). The conference committee adopted
a modified version of the Senate bill, increasing
the exemption phaseout threshold substantially
to $1 million for married taxpayers filing jointly
19
($500,000 otherwise).
The primary question asked in this article is
what the significance is of the failure to repeal the
AMT. I argue below that the combination of
increasing the AMT exemption, raising the
exemption phaseout threshold, and eliminating

14

See, e.g., Jim Nunns et al., “An Analysis of Donald Trump’s Tax
Plan,” Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center (Dec. 22, 2015).
15

See Big Six, “Unified Framework for Fixing Our Broken Tax Code,”
at 5 (Sept. 27, 2017).
16

8

See section 2001 of H.R. 1 as passed by the House on November 9,
2017. See also Joint Committee on Taxation, “Description of the
Chairman’s Mark of the ‘Tax Cuts and Jobs Act,’” JCX-51-17 (Nov. 9,
2017).

See supra note 5.

9

AMT taxpayers as a percentage of the U.S. population were
projected to be slightly lower in 2018 than 2005.
10

18

See generally sections 56-58.

11

See section 56(b)(1).

12

I include in the category of personal deductions the disallowance of
medical deductions between 10 percent and 7.5 percent and the
disallowance of home equity interest, which accounted for 0.38 percent
and 0.12 percent of all personal deductions, respectively.
13

17

Revenue estimates for the AMT provisions in the various bill stages
are discussed below.

See, e.g., David Cay Johnston, “Funny, They Don’t Look Like Fat
Cats,” The New York Times, Jan. 10, 1999.

Section 12001 of the amendment to H.R. 1, as passed by the Senate
on December 2, 2017. Married taxpayers filing separately aren’t
discussed in this article, but the various amounts for married taxpayers
filing separately are always half the amount for married taxpayers filing
jointly. References to married taxpayers filing jointly include surviving
spouses. References to unmarried individuals exclude surviving spouses
and heads of household.
19

Section 12003, H.R. 1, as reported in H.R. Rep. No. 115-466. See
section 55(d)(4).
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many AMT preferences greatly reduces the
impact of the AMT and returns it closer to its
original conception as a limited tax on individuals
with substantial preference income. To see this, it
is necessary to look at each filing status separately.
The AMT for Married Taxpayers Filing Jointly
Whether a taxpayer is subject to the AMT
depends, of course, on the AMT preferences to
which the taxpayer is entitled under the regular
tax. However, it also depends critically on the
relative rate structure of the regular and
alternative minimum taxes. The usual description
of the AMT is that it has a broader base and lower
rates, but that is not necessarily true. In significant
ranges of income, the marginal rate under the
AMT can exceed the marginal rate under the
regular tax. Because the regular tax and the AMT
use different definitions of taxable income,
however, it is difficult to directly compare their
rate structures. To do so, I assume a minimal set of
AMT preferences and compare the marginal rates
and total tax burdens under the regular and
alternative minimum taxes. My base case is a
married couple filing a joint return and taking the
standard deduction. I assume the couple is not
entitled to any credits and has no AMT
preferences other than the standard deduction
and (under current law) the personal
20
exemptions. Figure 2 shows the marginal rates
facing those taxpayers as a function of adjusted
gross income — which is assumed to be the same
21
under new and old law. Lines A and B indicate
the regular tax, and lines C and D indicate the
AMT. Lines A and C indicate old law, and lines B
and D indicate new law. Old law reflects inflation
adjustments through 2018. In other words, it is
what old law would have been in 2018 if the TCJA
22
hadn’t been enacted.
Compare first lines A and B — the old and
new regular taxes — noting that the horizontal

axis is measured in AGI, not taxable income. As
expected, marginal rates under new law (Line B)
are always at or below marginal rates under old
law (Line A), reflecting the general decline in
marginal rates under the TCJA.23
Now compare lines C and D — the old and
new AMTs. There are two major changes. First,
Line D rises from zero to 26 percent to the right of
Line C, reflecting the increase in the AMT
exemption under new law.24 Second, compare the
humps in lines C and D. The humps reflect the
effective increase in marginal rates because of the
phaseout of the AMT exemption. The exemption
phases out at a rate of 25 cents on the dollar,
effectively increasing the marginal rate by 6.5 or 7
percentage points.25 The hump shifts to the right
under new law because of the increase in the
26
phaseout threshold from $164,100 to $1 million.
In assessing the likelihood of a taxpayer being
subject to the AMT, we must compare the lines A,
B, C, and D with each other. First, consider old law
— lines A and C. From $86,000 (the AMT
exemption amount) to $320,000 (the start of the
personal exemption phaseout under the regular
tax), the marginal rate under the AMT exceeds the
marginal rate under the regular tax. Of course,
merely because the marginal rate under the AMT
exceeds the marginal rate under the regular tax
does not mean that the total AMT exceeds the
regular tax. That depends on the cumulative area
between the two lines and is difficult to determine
from a graph of marginal rates, but Figure 2 does
show that the story is more nuanced than the
simple broad-base, low-rate description of the
AMT.
What about under new law (lines B and D)?
Under new law, there remains a region where
23

In lieu of the actual phaseout under section 151(d), I assume a
smooth phaseout over $125,000 of AGI, which equals an increase in
marginal rate of approximately 1.1 percent.
24

Compare section 55(d)(1) (AMT exemption under old law) as
adjusted for inflation with section 55(d)(4) (AMT exemption under the
TCJA).

20

My base case is minimal in the sense that it is the simplest case. It is
not minimal in the sense of minimizing AMT preferences because the
standard deduction itself is an AMT preference item. Section 56(b)(1)(E).
21

I also assume that the taxpayer is not entitled to take the 20 percent
deduction for qualified business income and has no income entitled to
the capital gains preference. See sections 199A (qualified business
income deduction under new law) and 1(h) (capital gains preference
under old and new law).
22

Inflation adjustments are from Rev. Proc. 2017-58, 2017-45 IRB 489,
issued by the IRS before the passage of the TCJA.

25

Under new law, the entire phaseout is in the 28 percent bracket,
leading to an incremental marginal rate of 7 percent (28 percent x 25
percent). Under old law, the phaseout begins in the 26 percent bracket,
and thus initially raises the marginal rate by 6.5 percent (26 percent x 25
percent).
26

There is a third minor change in the AMT. While the TCJA did not
directly change the start of the 28 percent bracket in section 55, it did
change the method by which the 28 percent bracket is adjusted for
inflation. As a result, under new law the 28 percent bracket starts at
$191,100 rather than $191,500.
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Line D is above Line B — that is, an area where the
marginal rate under the AMT exceeds the
marginal rate under the regular tax. That region,
however, has shifted to the right, now extending
from $109,400 (the AMT exemption level) to
$339,000 (the start of the regular tax 32 percent
bracket). By shifting to the right the region where
the AMT rate exceeds the regular tax, the TCJA
makes it less likely that the AMT will be binding
27
on the taxpayer.
Although looking at marginal rates is
informative, ultimately what must be compared
are total tax liabilities, not marginal rates. Total
tax liabilities are compared in Figure 3. As in
Figure 2, lines A and B are used for the regular tax
and lines C and D for the AMT. Lines B and D are
used for the new law, and lines A and C are used

for the old laws. The other lines are explained
below.
As before, first compare lines A and B
representing the old and new regular tax,
respectively. As expected, Line B lies strictly
below Line A, indicating a tax cut at all income
levels for which tax was due.28 Similarly Line D
(new AMT) is below Line C (old AMT), at least
until an AGI of $1,437,600, at which point the
exemption in the new AMT has been fully phased
29
out and the two taxes are practically identical.
Now compare lines A and C, the old regular
and old alternative minimum taxes. What is

28

Of course, the conclusion that the total tax liability is always less
under new law holds only given my assumptions. For example, if the
taxpayer had large SALT deductions, the tax could easily be greater
under new law. All I have shown is that for a married couple filing
jointly, the increase in the standard deduction and the revisions to the
brackets more than make up for the loss of the personal exemptions.
29

27

By shifting the region where the AMT rate exceeds the regular tax
rate to the right, the TCJA expands the initial region where the regular
tax rate exceeds the AMT rate.

The new AMT is $8 greater than the old AMT because the 28
percent bracket starts at $191,100 rather than $191,500, which has the
effect of taxing the difference, $400, at an extra 2 percent rate. See supra
note 26.

500

TAX NOTES, APRIL 23, 2018
For more Tax Notes content, please visit www.taxnotes.com.

© 2018 Tax Analysts. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.

VIEWPOINT

striking is that for a significant region, from about
$300,000 to $500,000 of AGI, the two lines are
difficult to separate. In other words, without any
preferences other than the standard deduction
and the personal exemptions, the AMT is roughly
the same as the regular tax. As a result, if
taxpayers in this region have any significant
additional preference income, they are quickly
subject to the AMT.
To see this more clearly, lines E and F show
what I call the AMT cushion. I define the AMT
cushion as the excess of the regular tax over the
30
AMT as a percentage of the regular tax. The scale
for the AMT cushion is shown on the right axis. At
any given AGI, the larger the cushion, the greater
the amount of preference income required to
subject the taxpayer to the AMT. If the cushion is
small, only a small amount of preference income

30

AMT cushion = (regular tax - AMT)/(regular tax).

is required to trigger the AMT. If the cushion is
less than zero, the taxpayer is subject to the AMT.
As can be seen from Line E in Figure 3, the
AMT cushion is U-shaped. It initially plummets
as AGI rises, flattens out, rises again sharply, and
eventually levels off. What is striking about the
graph is that the cushion is quite small for a
substantial range of income. In particular, the
cushion is less than 5 percent for AGI between
about $250,000 and $560,000, and drops as low as
1 percent from about $320,000 to $500,000. Over
this range, the difference between the two taxes is
razor thin.
For example, as little in additional AMT
preferences as a third personal exemption would
be enough to subject the taxpayers in my example
to the AMT over the region of roughly $290,000 to
$370,000. Figure 3 makes clear why so many
taxpayers were subject to the AMT under old law
and that the primary target of the AMT was
taxpayers roughly in the range of $250,000 to
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$500,000 of income. Those taxpayers are well-off
by any reasonable measure, but a far cry from the
original targets of the AMT who earned over $1.5
million in today’s dollars. By contrast, for
taxpayers with AGI over $1 million, the cushion
starts at 17.6 percent and increases gradually
31
toward 29.3 percent. Thus, under old law, very
high-income taxpayers were subject to the AMT
only if they had large amounts of preference
32
income. At the same time, taxpayers with
incomes between roughly $250,000 and $500,000
were often caught in what might be called the
AMT trap — the U-shaped region shown in
Figure 3.
What about under new law? In comparing
lines B and D in Figure 3, it’s clear that under new
law there is generally more separation between
the regular and alternative minimum taxes. The
separation can be seen more clearly by looking at
Line F, which shows the cushion between the
regular and alternative minimum taxes under
new law. For incomes under $1 million (when the
AMT exemption begins to phase out), Line F lies
well above Line E. Its minimum is about 6 percent,
and given its sharp V shape, it is at its minimum
only at a single point and then rises steeply.33 That
contrasts starkly with old law, under which the
AMT cushion was 5 percent or less for a range of
over $400,000 of AGI. Thus, the AMT trap has
been substantially reduced. Starting at $1 million,
the cushion shrinks from a peak of about 18
percent to a trough of about 14 percent as the
AMT exemption phases out. Once the exemption
is fully phased out at $1,437,600, the cushion rises
toward its asymptote of 24.3 percent.34 The

asymptote under new law is less than the
asymptote under old law because of the decline in
the regular tax top bracket from 39.6 percent to 37
percent without a concomitant decline in the
AMT top bracket.
It’s clear, therefore, simply by comparing the
AMT cushion under old and new law, that the
structure of the AMT under new law substantially
reduces the impact of the AMT. What about AMT
preferences? Will there likely be an increase in
AMT preferences that will offset the structural
advantages of the revised AMT? To the contrary,
there will likely be a substantial decrease in
preference income under new law. The most
significant change is the $10,000 cap on the SALT
deduction, which as shown in Table 1 accounted
35
for over 60 percent of preferences in 2012. Of
course, the capped SALT deduction is still a
preference item, but as I argue below, it alone
could never be sufficient to subject a taxpayer to
the AMT.
The TCJA also eliminates personal
exemptions and miscellaneous itemized
deductions, which together accounted for over 30
percent of preferences in 2012.36 Finally, although
of much less empirical importance, the TCJA
eliminated the deduction for interest on home
equity indebtedness, thus further reducing
potential AMT preferences. Of course, the TCJA
substantially increases the standard deduction,
which is also a preference item under the AMT.
The increased standard deduction, however, has
been fully accounted for in Figure 3.
At the AMT marginal rate of 26 or 28 percent,
the $10,000 SALT deduction under the TCJA
would increase the AMT by $2,600 or $2,800.
Although unclear from Figure 3, the gap between
the regular and alternative minimum taxes (in the

31

For very high incomes, the AMT approaches a flat tax at 28 percent,
and the regular tax approaches a flat tax at 39.6 percent. The AMT
cushion, therefore, approaches 29.3 percent ((39.6 percent - 28 percent)/
39.6 percent) asymptotically.
32

Given their phaseout, personal exemptions could not be a source of
preference income. Also, given the amount of preference income
required, it is unlikely that state and local taxes alone could generate
enough preference income to trigger the AMT.
33

The minimum point is at an AGI of $339,000, which, given the
$24,000 standard deduction, gives a taxable income of $315,000. At that
point, the marginal rate on the regular tax jumps from 24 percent to 32
percent as compared with an AMT marginal rate of 28 percent.
34

For very high incomes, the AMT approaches a flat tax at 28 percent
and the regular tax approaches a flat tax at 37 percent. The AMT
cushion, therefore, approaches 24.3 percent ((37 percent - 28 percent)/37
percent). Cf. note 31.

35

See section 174(b)(6) (imposing $10,000 cap on SALT deductions).

36

The old regular tax permitted miscellaneous itemized deductions
only to the extent they exceeded 2 percent of AGI. Section 67. The AMT
preference item, therefore, was the excess of those deductions over the
floor. Under new law, the deductions are entirely disallowed. See section
67(g).
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range where the AMT is positive) is as small as
$3,721. Adding a preference item of $10,000 at a 26
or 28 percent tax rate would thus appear to
substantially eliminate the gap between the AMT
and the regular tax, making it much more likely
that other preference items would make the
37
taxpayer subject to the AMT.
The problem with this analysis is that it is
inconsistent with the assumption that the
taxpayer takes the standard deduction. To take a
SALT deduction, a taxpayer must itemize
38
deductions. And if the taxpayer itemizes, the
taxpayer cannot also take the standard deduction.
Thus, a taxpaying couple can have a $10,000 SALT
preference only if they don’t have a $24,000
standard deduction preference. The effect of
taking a $10,000 SALT deduction, therefore, is to
reduce AMT preferences by $14,000. In other
words, taking the SALT deduction makes a
taxpayer less likely to be subject to the AMT.
Consider again Figure 3. Line G shows the AMT
cushion assuming the taxpayers have itemized
deductions of $24,000, including $10,000 in SALT
deductions and $14,000 in non-preference
deductions. As expected, the AMT cushion with
the SALT deduction (Line G) lies strictly above the
AMT cushion with the standard deduction (Line
F). In particular, assuming the SALT deduction
doubles the minimum AMT cushion from about 6
percent to about 12 percent.
The AMT for Unmarried Taxpayers
The analysis above is limited to married
taxpayers filing jointly. This part provides a
parallel analysis for individuals filing as
unmarried, and the next part does so for
individuals filing as head of household. Figure 4
provides the same information as Figure 3, but
assumes an unmarried taxpayer with (under old
law) a single personal exemption. Consider first
the change to the regular tax for unmarried
taxpayers by comparing Line A (old regular tax)
and Line B (new regular tax). While Line B is
always below Line A, the two lines are closer
together in Figure 4 than in Figure 3. The

37

A $10,000 preference would reduce the minimum cushion from 5.8
percent to 1.4 percent.
38

See sections 62 and 63.

closeness of the lines indicates that at least in
some regions, the tax cut given by the TCJA to
unmarried individuals was less generous than the
tax cut for married couples. In particular, under
new law the 35 percent bracket starts at a taxable
income of $200,000, while under old law the 35
percent bracket does not start until $424,950. An
unmarried taxpayer with AGI of $431,450 and
taking the standard deduction under both old and
new law would save only $807 under the new law,
a reduction in taxes of only 0.65 percent. The fact
that the TCJA is less generous to unmarried
individuals is the flip side of the fact that it
eliminated the marriage penalty for the regular
39
tax in all but the top bracket. As discussed below,
Congress took the opposite tack with the AMT.
In terms of the bite of the AMT under old law,
Figure 4 tells a story that is qualitatively similar to
the case of married filing jointly taxpayers. To see
this, compare lines A and C (the regular and
alternative minimum taxes under old law) as
summarized by the again U-shaped Line E (the
AMT cushion under old law). For unmarried
taxpayers, there is a substantial region under old
law where the AMT cushion is less than 5 percent
(corresponding to an AGI of roughly $235,000 to
$425,000). The cushion reaches a minimum of
about 1.6 percent at an AGI of around $345,000.
Under old law, the addition of as few as two
personal exemptions would be sufficient to
subject a taxpayer with AGI in the range of about
$240,000 to $310,000 to the AMT.40
By contrast, under new law the U-shaped
AMT trap has essentially disappeared. The

39

The marriage penalty is eliminated when married filing jointly
brackets are twice unmarried brackets. Previously, the marriage penalty
had been eliminated only for the 10 and 15 percent brackets and the
standard deduction. See section 1(f)(8) (15 percent bracket), 1(i)(B) (10
percent bracket), and 64(c)(2) (standard deduction) as modified by
EGTRRA, sections 302(a), 101(a), and 301(a), respectively). The TCJA
extended the marriage penalty elimination to all but the top bracket.
Compare section 1(j)(2)(A) with section 1(j)(2)(C). The top bracket for
unmarried individuals begins at $500,000 under the TCJA, while for
married taxpayers filing jointly it begins at $600,000, only 120 percent of
the unmarried level. Moving in the other direction, the TCJA introduced
a new marriage penalty in the cap on the SALT deduction. An
unmarried couple can deduct a total of $20,000 in state and local taxes. If
they are married, their deduction is capped at $10,000. See section
164(b)(6)(B). The maximum marriage penalty as a result of the start of
the 37 percent bracket is $8,000 ($400,000 * (37 percent - 35 percent)). The
cap on SALT deductions adds a potential marriage penalty of up to
$3,700 ($10,000 x 37 percent).
40

An unmarried individual with more than one exemption might,
but would not necessarily, qualify for head of household status. See
section 2(b). Head of household status is discussed below.
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minimum cushion for AGI less than $500,000 —
where the trap used to be — is more than 19
41
percent. The overall minimum cushion of
approximately 14 percent is reached at $781,200
when the AMT exemption is fully phased out.42
The AMT trap is smaller (the AMT cushion is
generally greater) for unmarried taxpayers than
for married taxpayers under new law because the
marriage penalty has been eliminated under the
regular tax, while being maintained under the
AMT. In other words, the treatment of unmarried

41

The cushion reaches a local minimum of approximately 19.4
percent at an AGI of about $210,000.

individuals is relatively harsh under the regular
tax and relatively lenient under the AMT, thereby
increasing the gap between the two taxes.
The AMT marriage penalty arises from both
the AMT exemption and the start of the 28 percent
bracket. The married AMT exemption amount,
$109,400, is only 156 percent (rather than 200
percent) of the unmarried exemption, $70,300,
and the 28 percent bracket starts at $191,100 for
both married and unmarried taxpayers. On the
other hand, the start of the phaseout for married
filers, $1 million, is 200 percent of the unmarried
threshold, $500,000, so no further marriage
penalty is created by the phaseout threshold. The
flip side of a marriage penalty is, of course, a
single’s bonus. It is this single’s bonus in the AMT
with no corresponding single’s bonus for the
regular tax that explains why the AMT is less
binding on unmarried than on married taxpayers
under new law.

42

For an unmarried individual, the exemption is set at $70,300 and
phases out between an AGI of $500,000 and $781,200. See section
55(d)(4).
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The AMT for Head of Household Taxpayers
The final filing status that should be
43
considered is head of household. For my base
case, I assume the taxpayer takes the standard
deduction and, under old law, two personal
exemptions: one for the taxpayer and one for the
44
required dependent. I assume the dependent is
eligible for the child tax credit under both old and
45
new law. The results are shown in Figure 5.

43

Head of household status is defined in section 2(b) as an unmarried
individual who maintains his home as a household for a dependent or
maintains a household for a parent who is a dependent.
44

Under old law, the standard deduction for a head of household is
$9,550 for 2018. Under new law, it is $18,000. Compare section 63(c)(2)(B)
with section 63(c)(7)(i).
45

See section 24(a) ($1,000 child credit under old law) and section
24(h)(2) ($2,000 child credit under new law). Since the credit is not an
AMT preference, including the credit has no effect on the gap between
the AMT and the regular tax. Including the credit does increase the AMT
cushion because the cushion is defined as the gap divided by the regular
tax.

Consider first the AMT under old law.
Comparing Line C (AMT) and Line A (regular
tax), it’s clear that the AMT line lies above the
regular tax line over a substantial range,
indicating that in the base case the AMT is
binding. The binding nature of the AMT can also
be seen by looking at the AMT cushion shown by
Line E. Once again, the AMT cushion is U-shaped
with a large region from about $145,000 to
$490,000 of AGI that is less than 5 percent. This
time, however, there is a significant region, from
about $167,000 to $405,000, where the cushion is
negative, meaning that the taxpayer would be
subject to the AMT regardless of preferences other
than the standard deduction and the two personal
exemptions. Although the values shown on the
graph are truncated at zero, the largest negative
cushion (in percentage terms) is at an AGI of
about $235,000, where the cushion is negative 6.6
percent, representing an AMT of about $3,300
over the regular tax. The obvious question is, why
does the AMT cushion drop under head of
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household status relative to unmarried status?
The answer is simple: The benefits of head of
household status apply only to the regular tax and
not to the AMT. Thus, relative to an unmarried
individual, the larger standard deduction and the
additional personal exemption are both
additional preference items. Moreover, the more
favorable head of household rate structure acts
like an implicit AMT preference.
To put this result in context, it is worth making
two points. First, although there is a substantial
range of AGI for which the base case is subject to
the AMT under old law, there are relatively few
taxpayers who file as head of household and have
income in that range. Based on 2015 data, the most
recent year available, roughly 15 percent of tax
returns are filed as head of household. Of those
filing as head of household, only about 0.6 percent
report AGI in the range of $200,000 to $500,000.
This means that only 0.09 percent of taxpayers, or
about 135,000 individuals, file returns that are
46
likely to fall into this particular AMT trap. Of
course, just because few taxpayers are affected
does not mean it is sensible from a policy
perspective. If, for example, it is believed that
head of household benefits should be phased out
for high-income taxpayers, it does not explain
why the AMT should be designed to take away
those benefits from taxpayers in the $200,000 to
$500,000 range but not from those earning more
than $500,000. It is also worth noting that when
originally enacted, the AMT covered only 140,000
taxpayers, about the same number of taxpayers
47
who are likely to be affected by this AMT trap.
Second, as discussed above, since the
standard deduction is an AMT preference, a
taxpayer who itemizes can have reduced
preferences. Consider, for example, a taxpayer
who has itemized deductions equal to the
standard deduction, all of which are nonpreference items (for example, charitable
deductions and qualified housing interest). Such a
taxpayer would have the same taxable income for
the regular tax as a taxpayer taking the standard
deduction, but her income subject to the AMT

46

Computations are based on IRS Statistics of Income division,
“Individual Income Tax Returns (Complete Report),” Publication 1304,
Table 1.2 (Sept. 2017).
47

See supra note 7.

would be reduced by $9,550, the amount of the
standard deduction. Even then, however, that
taxpayer would be subject to the AMT over the
AGI region of approximately $225,000 to $370,000.
Under new law, however, the AMT trap
shrinks substantially. As with married taxpayers
filing jointly, the AMT cushion has a distinct V
shape. The minimum cushion is 10.9 percent at
$175,500 and rises steeply in both directions. This
relatively generous cushion is attributable to the
increased AMT exemption that along with the
irrelevance of personal exemptions outweighs the
loss of the increased standard deduction and
special head of household brackets.
In summary, whether filing as unmarried or
head of household, individual taxpayers are much
less likely to be subject to the AMT under new law
than under old law. Moreover, given the cap on
SALT deductions, the repeal of personal
exemptions, and the nondeductibility of all
miscellaneous itemized deductions under the new
regular tax, taxpayers who are subject to the AMT
are likely to look a lot more like the original intended
targets of the tax. They are likely to be very highincome taxpayers taking advantage of tax
provisions that look more like traditional loopholes.
Scoring the AMT Change
The analysis above is abstract in the sense that
for the most part it is based on the law, but not on
the application of actual taxpayer data to that law.
It will be a few years before we have data on the
number and types of taxpayers affected by the
AMT under new law. We do, however, have a
source of predictions based on historical taxpayer
data. As part of the legislative process leading up
to the enactment of the TCJA, the Joint Committee
on Taxation provided revenue estimates both for
AMT repeal and for retaining the AMT with
increased exemptions and thresholds. By
comparing those revenue estimates, or scores, we
can learn something about what the revenue
estimators thought of the revised AMT based on
existing taxpayer data.
Table 2 shows a selection of revenue estimates
from the legislation at different points in the
legislative process. The House bill, which provided
for full repeal of the individual AMT, was scored at
$72.8 billion for the first full year and $695.5 billion
over 10 years. To put that figure in perspective, the
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Table 2. Revenue Estimates for TCJA Individual AMT Provisions

10-Year

Total
Individual
Provisions

10-Year AMT as
Percentage of
Total Individual

$72.8

$695.5

$963.7

72%

Full repeal

$74.3

$706.7

$902.9

78%

Senate — Chairman’s
modification to the
Chairman’s mark

Full repeal with sunset

$97.2

$769.1

$885.9

87%

Senate bill

Exemption increased to
$109,400/$70,300;
threshold increased to
$208,400/$156,300

$82.0

$636.2

$1021.3

62%

Conference agreement

Exemption increased to
$109,400/$70,300;
threshold increased to
$1,000,000/$500,000

$82.5

$637.1

$1,126.6

57%

Estimated AMT revenues
before passage of TCJA

$39.1

$492.4

n/a

n/a

Description

1st Full
Year

House bill

Full repeal

Senate — Chairman’s mark

Legislative Status

Old law

All estimates are in billions of dollars.
Rows 1-5 show fiscal-year estimates from the JCT.
Sources: JCX-54-17, JCX-52-17, JCX-57-17, JCX-63-17, & H. R. Rep. No. 115-466, respectively.
Row 6 shows calendar-year estimates from the Tax Policy Center.
Source: http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/model-estimates/baseline-alternative-minimum-tax-amt-tables-april-2017/t17-0145aggregate-amt.

overall 10-year cost of the individual portions of the
bill was $963.7 billion. Thus, AMT repeal accounted
for some 72 percent of the overall cost of the bill.
That figure is deceptive, however. In particular, it
doesn’t mean that the AMT was raising that much
revenue under old law. To the contrary, the UrbanBrookings Tax Policy Center estimated that under
old law, the AMT was expected to raise $39 billion in
calendar year 2018 and $492 billion over the 20182027 period. In other words, the revenue estimate
for repeal was about 85 percent higher for the first
year and about 40 percent higher over 10 years than
the estimated revenue generated by the AMT.48 The
explanation for this discrepancy is presumably that
AMT repeal was scored after scoring the other
individual provisions, including the rate changes
and the increased standard deduction. In other

words, it was an estimate of the bite of the old AMT
relative to the new regular tax. That in turn explains
why the revenue estimate for the chairman’s mark
(the first Senate draft), which also provided for full
repeal, is a little higher (about 2 percent) than the
House score. As the bill became more generous, the
cost of AMT repeal relative to the new baseline
increased. In turn, the second Senate draft, the
chairman’s modification to the chairman’s mark,
was more generous in its individual provisions,
leading to a one-year estimate for AMT repeal of $97
billion, a 31 percent increase over the chairman’s
mark.49 At the same time, the 10-year estimate rose
only by 9 percent, reflecting the newly introduced
50
eight-year sunset of the bill’s individual provisions.

49

JCT, “Description of the Chairman’s Modification to the Chairman’s
Mark of the ‘Tax Cuts and Jobs Act,’” JCX-56-17 (Nov. 14, 2017).
48

The Tax Policy Center estimates are based on calendar years, and
the JCT estimates are based on fiscal years, so they are not strictly
comparable.

50

In general, in the chairman’s modification to the chairman’s mark
and in subsequent drafts, the bill’s individual provisions sunset after
2025.
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The Senate bill and the subsequent conference
agreement abandoned AMT repeal, and as
discussed above, substituted a scaled-back AMT
with an increased AMT exemption and phaseout
threshold. Both were scored similarly.51 The
revenue cost for the AMT changes in the
conference agreement was $82.5 billion in the first
full year and $637.1 billion over 10 years (taking
into account the sunset). The one-year figure of
$82.5 billion is about 85 percent of the one-year
cost of full repeal in the chairman’s modification
— $97.2 billion. The relative costs suggest that the
increase in the exemption and threshold were
viewed as making substantial progress toward
repeal. Thus, the revenue estimates support the
argument that the AMT has been substantially
tamed by the TCJA — at least until 2026 when the
new law becomes old law and old law becomes
new law once again.


51

A separate question not addressed is why these scores were so
similar given that the Senate bill had an exemption phaseout threshold
of $208,400 for married taxpayers filing jointly and $156,300 for
unmarried taxpayers, while the conference bill had a much greater
exemption phaseout threshold of $1 million for married taxpayers filing
jointly and $500,000 for unmarried taxpayers.
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